The generals are the last to know

Description

What is the closest picture that can be drawn of the catastrophe that befell Iraq? What part of the story is missing? What should have happened that didn’t? Why didn’t? Could we or should we have avoided going to Kuwait, and thus avoiding entering the war and confronting the world? What did the Iraqi leadership rely on? … Was there someone who misled it, or was it the one who misled its direct allies and lured them into a major historical predicament? … There are always unanswered questions… but “Saad Al-Bazzaz” answers them, as the answers come within information emerging from the edges of this book, which he tries to trace from witnesses, planners, and implementers, and from the pages of documents whose authors are keen to keep secret for at least two or three decades. Perhaps there is someone here who has an objection from some quarter to this book, and the author here does not find himself upset that his books are still banned in most of the countries concerned with their topics. Therefore, he deals with information and documents in a selective manner, and refuses to focus the spotlight on one topic of time and place, and avoids theorizing until it seems more like an attempt to fill in the blanks and fill in the gaps left by all the entry into Kuwait with the highest amount of information, which could be verified six years after its occurrence… So who knew? … And who bears responsibility? … Who made the decision? … And who followed him halfway? And who went through with it to the end?… If the generals were the last to know… then who knew in the era of the (Jahjahun)? Perhaps this is what the author is trying to reveal in this book.