Description
At the time of the first truce in the Palestine War, the Jordanian Arab Army did not possess enough heavy weaponry to sustain combat for even two days. During that truce period, we traveled to Egypt, presented our assessment, and asked the late Nokrashy Pasha about Egypt’s intentions. He assured us of their commitment to the cause and their resolve to continue the struggle until complete success was achieved. We also conveyed to the Egyptian Royal Court our desire—in our capacity as Commander-in-Chief—to visit the Egyptian High Command in Palestine; however, it was suggested that such a visit would be inappropriate, given that His Majesty had not yet visited the front himself. I then proposed that His Majesty visit Jerusalem, but the risks of air travel were cited. I countered that a route via Suez, Aqaba, and Amman was feasible, yet other excuses were offered. Ultimately, we did not succeed in recovering the equipment seized by Egyptian forces, nor in securing full command authority for the Unified Command, nor in persuading His Majesty to carry out the aforementioned visit. In short, the forces of the four states were not—in terms of operational command—subject to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief responsible for all the armies. Subsequently, I traveled to Najd while the Arab League was in session in Egypt. I had issued instructions to our then-Prime Minister, Tawfiq Pasha Abu al-Huda, that the first truce must not be violated under any circumstances—even if it meant the resignation of the government—until the army was adequately supplied with the necessary heavy and light weaponry. Regrettably, however, upon my arrival in Baghdad while returning from Riyadh, I was informed by His Excellency Sayyid al-Pachachi that the truce had been broken. I was overcome with a degree of distress and anguish that I cannot even describe. Consequently, as Jewish forces launched operations against Lydda and Ramla, the Iraqi and Jordanian commands—lacking sufficient equipment—found themselves unable to engage in a full-scale military confrontation, and thus chose to hold onto the resources they still possessed. “…to repel hostile attacks—from whatever direction they might come—to the greatest extent possible. This serves as the clearest evidence of the poor management of the Arab League, and the consequences borne by its member states as a result of its misguided and failed policies… This is but a portion of what we have chosen to reveal at this time.”
With this level of precise detail, His Majesty King Abdullah I bin Al-Hussein (may God have mercy upon him) recounts the state of the Arab world during the war in Palestine. Prior to this, he describes—with equal detail—the positions and issues surrounding the Great Arab Revolt, from its inception and subsequent victories, to his own establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan and, later, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
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